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ARTICLE INFO  ABSTRACT 
Article history:  An effective board of directors is central to agency 
theory’s prescription to solving the problems of 
separation of ownership from control in the modern 
corporation. The shareholders’ confidence in the 
board’s ability to fulfil its duties is an important 
measure of the success or otherwise of this 
cornerstone of agency theory. The Board Shareholder 
Confidence Index, focuses on the board of directors 
and is the standard by which Canadian governance 
best practices are measured. This paper investigates 
the relationship between board effectiveness and 
company performance.  
Using a sample of 888 firm year observations from 
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2003 to 2009, we find a positive association between 
the firm’s measure of board effectiveness and the 
firm’s contemporaneous and future market measure of 
performance, Tobin’s Q. The results hold across a 
number of econometric models that control for 
different types of endogeneities.  
Keywords: Agency Theory, Board Effectiveness, Corporate Governance, Firm Performance 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Asymmetry of information between managers and shareholders is the result of the separation of ownership from control in large 
public corporations (Fama and Jensen, 1983). The principal-agent model, espoused by Jensen and Meckling (1976), suggests that 
because shareholders cannot directly observe managers’ efforts,  moral hazard thus results greater market pricing agency risk. A 
possible solution to the problem of agency risk and information asymmetry, according to both the theoretical and empirical evidence, 
is through the monitoring of firms by financial and information intermediaries, Beasley et al., 2000; Dechow et al., 1996; Titman and 
Trueman, 1986; Diamond, 1996).    Also, by implementing effective corporate governance mechanisms, information asymmetry and 
agency risk can be reduced (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Renders et al., 2010). Jensen and Meckling (1976) agency theory suggests 
that there ought to be a positive impact on firm value for firms employing such governance devices and thus better governance  and a 
effective board can raise firm value.  
 
Canada’s principles-based corporate governance regime for listed companies provides firms with the flexibility to tailor their 
corporate governance practices to their specific circumstances. It assumes that a “one size fits all’ approach (a rules-based regime1) is 
not best policy, given the material differences between firms with regard to size and complexity. The underlying assumption of this 
                                                 
1 Broshko , Li, 2006 compare the principles-based and rules-based corporate governance approaches in Canada and the U.S.  
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governance regime is that the capital market will assess and monitor a firm’s compliance with the corporate governance code and, 
thus, reward or punish the firm via its share price (Easterbrook and Fischel, 1996) or accept the firm’s disclosure for non-compliance 
(Anand, 2005).  
 
The Board Shareholder Confidence Index (BSCI), published by the Clarkson Centre for Business Ethics and Board Effectiveness 
(CCBE) provides a finely focussed assessment of board effectiveness and “comprises factors used by active investors to assess Boards 
of Directors for corporate governance best practices...... we capture those factors that influence shareholders’ confidence in a Board’s 
ability to fulfil their duties” 2. This paper has two main objectives. Firstly,  we investigate the relationship between a firm’s BSCI 
composite grade, Board Effectiveness (and its component parts) and the firm’s performance, where performance is measured by a 
contemporaneous and future Tobin’s Q. Secondly, given that many of Canada’s listed firms are either family run or closely held, we 
explore the firm’s voting structure as a possible alternative corporate governance mechanism.  
 
                                                 
 
2 http://www.rotman.utoronto.ca/ccbe/ 
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This paper is organised as follows: the following section reviews the literature and develops our hypotheses. Then, we introduce 
the data and the methodology, followed by the empirical results. Finally we summarise the paper and provide a concluding discussion. 
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1. Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
The separation between ownership and control is the result of the modern corporation and its capital requirements which generally 
requires multiple owners (shareholders), (Berle and Means, 1932).  These owners contract executives to manage the corporation on 
their behalf. Agency theory’s “model of man” is that of the rational actor seeking to maximise his or her individual utility, (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). The owners (principals) employ the executives (agents) to maximise their investment in the corporation. The agent, 
while charged to maximise firm value, perceives opportunities to maximise his/her own utility. To protect owners’ interests, minimise 
agency costs and ensure principal-agent interest alignment, agency theory prescribes compensation schemes and governance 
mechanisms. One such governance mechanism is the board of directors whose main task is to monitor executives on behalf of the 
shareholders.  Thus, the shareholders’ confidence in the board’s ability to fulfil its duties is an important measure of the success of this 
cornerstone of agency theory. The Board Shareholder Confidence Index (BSCI), published by the Clarkson Centre for Business Ethics 
and Board Effectiveness (CCBE) is one such measure of shareholders’ confidence.  
 
Canada realises its corporate governance requirements through the implementation of National Instrument 58-101 Disclosure of 
Corporate Governance Practices, National Policy 58-201 Corporate Governance Guidelines, and Multilateral Instrument 52-110 Audit 
Committees. Whilst the latter is mandatory, the Canadian approach to corporate governance is a principles-based approach (comply or 
8 
 
explain), similar to the practices adopted in the UK, other European countries and Australia. Thus, firms that constitute the S&P/TSX 
are required to disclose their compliance with the above instruments.  
 
A central issue in agency theory is the information asymmetry between absentee owners and managers who are in charge of the 
day-to-day running of the firm.  This requires the Board of Directors to put in place the mechanisms for reducing or eliminating such 
information asymmetries thereby ensuring shareholder confidence in the Board. From an economic perspective, well-functioning 
capital markets require resolution of the information, or “lemons”, problem (Akerlof, 1970).  Corporate disclosure solves this problem 
in capital markets and has been categorised into mandatory regulated financial statements and voluntarily disclosed information, with 
external information intermediaries such as financial analysts also reducing the information gap (Healy et al., 1999).  Firms that 
constitute the S&P/TSX index are required to disclose their compliance with the above instruments and thus their compliance with 
these instruments is an example of such corporate disclosure. The mandate of the CCBE “is to monitor Canadian corporate 
governance trends and to provide guidance to firms looking to improve their board effectiveness and disclosure”. Since 2002, the 
CCBE’s BSCI has become the standard by which Canadian governance best practices are measured. CCBE publishes the BSCI rating 
annually for each firm that is listed on the S&P/TSX composite index.  
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A number of prior studies suggest a link between well governed firms and firm value/performance, (for example, Gompers et 
al., 2003; Bebchuk et al., 2009); others have been unable to indicate firmly that good governance actually impacts positively on firm 
value/performance, (Core et al., 2006). Therefore, there is no empirical closure on the ongoing debate about the relationship between 
governance and firm valuation, which suggests the need for more evidence attesting to the link between governance and firm 
valuation. 
 
Arcot and Bruno (2007) use the quality of explanation as a proxy for a firm’s corporate governance choice. They examine the 
effects of corporate governance on performance for a sample of non-financial UK firms and find that “... a measure which accounts for 
different choices by companies of corporate governance is significantly associated with performance...”  They find that firms that do 
not comply with best practices, for valid reasons, perform exceptionally well and out-perform fully compliant firms and that mere 
compliance with the Combined Code does not necessarily result in better performance.  Selvaggi and Upton (2008) use the 
Association of British Insurers’ Institutional Voting Information Service as a measure of the quality of a firm’s corporate governance 
and report a strong negative correlation between performance and voting for firms that receive a red top (an indicator of major 
governance concern). They find that a portfolio of well governed firms delivers higher returns when adjusted for risk and has lower 
volatility of share-price returns.  In contrast, no discernible link is found between board structure (director affiliation and ownership, 
chairman affiliation, and committee composition) and firm performance, where performance is measured using accounting and market 
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measures of performance (Vafeas and Theodorou, 1998).  Using a sample of firms that constitute the FTSE Eurotop 300, Bauer et al. 
(2004) find a positive relationship between firm valuation and corporate governance variables. However, after adjusting for country 
differences, the relationship weakens substantially.  This contrasts to Gompers et al. (2003), who find a negative relationship between 
governance measures and earnings based measures of performance.  With regard to South Africa, Ntim et al.’s (2011) results indicate 
improved market value is associated with better compliance and disclosure of recommended corporate governance practices. The 
positive association between firm value and disclosure is stronger for shareholder than for stakeholder provisions.  
 
Canadian studies provide mixed results with regard to the association between corporate governance grades and measures of 
performance.  Whilst Adjaoud and Zeghal (2004) find a significant link (no link) between the corporate governance grades and value-
performance measures (accounting measures of performance), Klein et al. (2005) find that not all of the elements that constitute the 
aggregate governance grade are important.  Most notably, they find that no relationship between board independence and firm 
performance exists.  Also, Gupta et al. (2009), find no association between measures of firm performance, as measured by the market 
value of the firm, accounting measures of performance, and the composite grade, as well as the sub-category governance grades. No 
relation between the governance score and Tobin’s Q is found by Bozec et al. (2010). All the above Canadian studies use “The Globe 
and Mail” rankings, a notable exception is Switzer and Cao (2011) who use the BSCI index and report that higher index values are 
associated with higher Economic Value Added, although, the relationship is not monotonic. They do not, however, assess the 
11 
 
relationship between the component parts of the index and firm performance. Neither do they address the potential interrelations 
between corporate governance variables and other possible alternative corporate governance mechanisms (Agrawal and Knoeber, 
1996; Beiner et al., 2006).  We address these major methodological issues in this study. 
 
Given the importance of the board of directors in ensuring that the firm is efficiently managed, it can be argued that an 
efficient and effective board can lead to improved financial performance of the firm and ensures minimization of information 
asymmetry between the firm and the market.  Such a board will also instil a great deal of shareholder confidence.  Therefore, it can be 
argued that, an effective and efficient board could lead to a higher capital market valuation of a firm as a result of the confidence that 
market participants have in the board of directors. Thus, the first hypothesis tested in this study is: 
H1 There will be a positive relationship between Board Effectiveness and firm performance. 
 
Recent corporate governance reforms have highlighted the need for an enhanced role on the corporate board for non-executive 
directors. The BSCI component, individual potential, provides a measure of  independence. Independence (Cadbury, 1992) and the 
desire to preserve their reputation in the external labour market (Fama and Jensen, 1983) are important attributes that non-executive 
directors possess. However, the evidence regarding board independence and firm performance is mixed. Weir et al. (2002) find 
director independence for UK firms to be positively related to firm performance, albeit at marginally statistically significant levels.  
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Other studies support this finding, (Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1990; Chung et al., 2003). However Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) find no 
such relationship, whilst Matolcsky et al. (2002) find that, in general, independent directors do not add to shareholder value but do add 
value when the firm has relatively valuable growth options.  It can be argued that a board that has strong and effective independent 
members has the potential to reduce board excesses and other agency costs, thereby impacting positively on firm performance.  
Therefore, the second hypothesis tested in this study is: 
H2 There will be a positive relationship between shareholders’ confidence in a board with strong independent members and firm 
performance. 
 
Director stock ownership is perceived to align manager-shareholder interests according to agency theory and is, therefore, 
inversely related to agency conflicts between owners and managers. Whilst stock ownership may appear contradictory to the 
requirement for independence, the definition of independence under Canadian law does not preclude stock ownership, (Part 1.4, 
Multilateral Instrument 52-110 Audit Committees).  Evidence for the alignment of owner-manager interests through directors’ stock 
ownership is also mixed. As stock ownership increases (up to 5%) so does firm performance but then it falls beyond a certain point 
(25%) and then increases slightly at higher ownership levels, (Morck et al., 1988).  A curvilinear relationship between the fraction of 
shares held by corporate insiders and Tobin’s Q exists, (McConnell and Servaes, 1990). A possible explanation is that at higher 
ownership levels, managers become entrenched. No link is found between ownership structure and performance by Demsetz and Lehn 
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(1985).  A priori, we argue that if directors have significant stock ownership in their firm, it aligns their interests with that of 
shareholders and  provides the motivation to pursue policies that are also in the best interest of stockholders. Therefore, the third 
hypothesis tested in this study is: 
H3 There will be a positive relationship between director’s stock ownership and firm performance. 
 
CCBE defines group potential in their BSCI to include CEO/Chair split, committee independence and share structure. 
Proponents of good corporate governance argue that a firm’s leadership structure is critical to success/performance. Thus, splitting the 
roles of CEO and chairman permit the board to implement its control function more successfully. Firms that adopt this leadership 
structure outperform firms that retain the dual role, (Rechner and Dalton, 1991) and have lower costs and higher return on assets, (Pi 
and Timme, 1991).  In contrast, Brickley et al. (1997) report that there is insufficient evidence to support the hypothesis that 
separating the roles of CEO and chairman improves firm performance.  We argue that a board with a good structure should, in theory, 
raise performance, since it signifies a well-run firm. The fourth hypothesis tested in this study is: 
 
H4 There will be a positive relationship between confidence in the effectiveness of board structure and firm performance. 
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CCBE evaluates the results of board decisions in a final dimension, output. It assesses the practices that investor surveys regard as 
being opposed to the best interest of shareholders. In effect, they appraise the link between CEO/Directors’ incentive scheme (options; 
dilution, excessive granting, evergreen plans or re-pricing, and directors’ loans and pensions) and firm performance. Brown and 
Caylor (2006) find that option re-pricing, not occurring within the previous three years, and options granted, not exceeding 3% of 
basic shares outstanding, are both significantly associated with Tobin’s Q.  We argue that a board with a good output (good past 
practices), which is in the best interest of shareholders, should experience positive firm performance.  Therefore, the fifth hypothesis 
tested in this study is: 
 
H5 There will be a positive relationship between confidence in the effectiveness of board systems (evaluations) and firm 
performance. 
 
 
2. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
2.1 Sample and Data 
Governance data for our study is taken from CCBE who publishes the BSCI rating annually for each firm that enters the 
S&P/TSX composite index. The Centre evaluates each firm’s board of directors across three dimensions; individual potential (director 
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independence and director stock ownership), group potential (CEO/Chair split, committee independence and share structure), and past 
practices (evaluating the results of board decisions). To arrive at the corporate governance grade, CCBE begins by awarding each 
company 100 points from which deductions may be made in order to arrive at each firm’s Total Score.  
In order to arrive at the overall BSCI grade, CCBE evaluates each firm’s board of directors across three dimensions:  individual 
potential, group potential and past practices. Individual potential is evaluated based on two factors:  director independence and director 
stock ownership. Group potential is evaluated on board meeting structure, the implementation of board evaluation processes, use of a 
board skills matrix, director meeting attendance and disclosure of continuing education opportunities. Past practices are assessed by 
evaluating the results of board decisions; these include: excessive option grants, option re-pricing, CEO pay and performance, director 
pensions, option gains disclosed, outstanding loans to directors, evergreen option plans, majority voting in director elections and, 
finally, CEO succession practice and disclosure. 
 
Across each dimension, CCBE can deduct a maximum of 30 points and a minimum of 0 points depending on the dimension being 
assessed. Thus, across each dimension, a firm’s grade can range from AAA [highest], AA, A, B to C [lowest]. For example in 
assessing the dimension, individual potential and, in particular, the factor director independence, CCBE employs the following 
methodology: if 66.7% or more of the board is independent then no deduction is made and, thus, the firm would maintain the 100 
points awarded. On a sliding scale, the following deductions are made: 
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 %Independence Deduction 
Less than 30%  -15 
30%-49.9%  -10 
50%-59.9%    -5 
60%-66.6%    -3 
66.7% or more    0 
Similar procedures are adopted for the remaining components of the three dimensions. The overall grade is developed using four 
linked steps and the result is a transparent, objective, and adaptable rating system, which assigns companies listed on the S&P/TSX 
Composite Index an overall grade from AAA+ [highest], AAA, AA, A, B to C [lowest].  The detailed criteria and scoring mechanism 
for each component part of the BSCI can be obtained from the CCBE website3 (or see Switzer & Cao, 2011). It should be noted that 
between 2003 and 2009 new variables were introduced to each of the dimensions. In order to facilitate analysis we follow Beekes and 
Brown (2007) by rescaling the grades4 from 1-65, where 6 =AAA+, 5 = AAA, 4 = AA, 3 = A, 2 = B and 1 = C. 
                                                 
3 http://www.rotman.utoronto.ca/ccbe/2007glossary.pdf 
4 Our request to CCBE for the firms’ actual scores was denied. We also employed the median value of the overall score as a proxy for the actual score; thus, in 
Table 1, a firm that scored AAA, recorded a score of 97. Similar results to our 6-1 conversion mechanism were obtained using the median value proxy. 
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-------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
-------------------------- 
Thus, the sample in this study comprises those firms that are listed on the S&P/TSX Composite Index. We collect each firm’s 
annual BSCI rating.  The total number of firms, for which CCBE published a grade between 2003 and 2009 is contained in Table 2. 
CCBE publishes a total of 1414 firm year ratings, ranging from a maximum of 224 in 2005 to a minimum 156 in 2009.  In 2008, 197 
firms are listed on the S&P/TSX index compared to 157 in 2009, the biggest change in the index during the sample period. During this 
time 57 (17) firms are deleted from (added to) the index, as a result of the application of the S&P/TSX index criteria6. It would appear 
that the impact of these changes results in only one firm scoring AAA+ overall in 2009. 
-------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
-------------------------------------- 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
5 A similar procedure was adopted by Ben Amar W. and McIlkenny, P. 2013. Board effectiveness and the voluntary disclosure of 
climate change information, Business Strategy and the Environment  (Forthcoming) 
 
6 Additions to and deletions from the S&P/TSX Composite Index are generally only made as part of the Quarterly Review. The Index Committee 
assesses a firm’s market capitalization and liquidity amongst other criteria. http://www.tmx.com/en/pdf/0000Description.pdf 
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Our sample is based on all non-financial firms in the S&P/TSX index. We also apply the following sample selection 
requirements: all accounting and market value data must be available, and firms with annual revenues of less than $10 million are 
excluded; the latter we believe is inconsistent with being a listed firm. In applying our sample criteria, we obtain 699 firm year 
observations, ranging from a maximum of 114 in 2008 to a minimum of 90 in 2003. For the final sample of 699 firm year 
observations, the number of firms obtaining the grades, AAA+ [highest] to C [lowest], for each year are summarised in Table 2. Thus, 
of the 699 firm years, 174 (24%) obtain AA or higher, 415 (59%) obtain either A or B whilst 110 (16%) obtains the lowest grade C.  
Firms with a dual-class share structure represent 15% of the sample of 699 firm years.   
 
In Table 3, we report the frequency of the 699 firm year observations ranked by frequency across the Sector Description based 
on the two-digit SIC Code. The sectors in Column 1 cover 18 sectors and represent 89% of the sample. In the sample there are 52 
firms that have governance scores for all seven years, 2002-2009; thus 364 of the 699 firm year observations represent 52% of the 
sample.  
-------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
-------------------------------------- 
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For each firm in the sample, the accounting and market data for the performance analysis is collected (or computed) from Compustat and 
the alternative governance variable is collected from Stockguide.   
 
2.2 METHODOLOGY 
2.2.1 Firm Performance and Board Effectiveness  
We employ a market measure of performance for each firm, Tobin’s Q. Our final sample comprises only those firms that have 
data to permit the computation of Tobin’s Q 699 firms. Following Chung and Pruitt (1994), Tobin’s Q is computed as the market 
value of equity plus the book value of total assets minus the book value of equity scaled by the book value of total assets. Haniffa and 
Hudaib (2006) suggest that Tobin’s Q measures the market’s valuation of the quality of a firm’s corporate governance practices, with 
a higher Q suggesting greater effectiveness of a firm’s practices. In order to minimise potential omitted variables bias in our results, 
we employ a number of control variables: firm size, annual capital expenditure, leverage, and audit firm size in our study.  
 
Smaller firms have greater opportunities to grow and, thus, may have higher Tobin’s Q. (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Klapper 
and Love, 2004). However, because of greater agency problems, larger firms are more likely to adopt better corporate governance 
practices and, thus, they may have higher Tobin’s Q, (Beiner et al., 2006). High levels of leverage may create financial distress, which 
can restrict a firm’s ability to exploit growth opportunities (Jensen (1986)). However, Jensen also suggests that higher levels of 
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leverage can increase performance by reducing agency conflicts associated with having excess cash flows by opportunistic managers. 
Given the contradictory findings in the literature, we predict that firm size (TA), capital expenditure (CAPEX) and leverage (LTDTA), 
will relate either positively or negatively to Tobin’s Q. DeAngelo (1981) and Barako et al. (2006) determine that audit quality and 
auditor independence are positively associated with audit firm size, which suggests that firms may have higher Tobin’s Q if they are 
audited by a BIG4 audit firm. Thus, a positive association between Tobin’s Q and a BIG4 audit firm (AuditCode) is predicted. 
Gompers et al., (2003) suggest that investing in firms with greater shareholder rights, better governed firms, earn an annual abnormal 
return of 8.5% compared to investing in firms with weaker shareholder rights. Thus we include a firm’s annual share price return and 
predict a positive association between Tobin’s Q and the annual share price return. Table 4 provides a summary of all variables 
employed. 
-------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
-------------------------------------- 
 
The relationship between the measure of board effectiveness and the market measure of performance is investigated using the 
regression 
∑
=
+++=
n
i
ititiitit CONTROLStivenessBoardEffecPerf
1
10 εββα    (1) 
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where Perfit is represented by the contemporaneous Tobin’s Q, Board Effectiveness represents, the BSCI composite grade, and 
CONTROLS refers to control variables, including; firm size, which is measured as the value of total assets, (TA) for each firm in each 
year, leverage which is measured as long-term debt to total assets- (LTDTA), annual capital expenditure  (CAPEX), and BIG4 audit 
firm, (AUDITCODE),. We also investigate the relationship between the market measure of performance and the component parts of 
the governance grade; thus, Board Effectiveness represents independence, stock ownership, structure, systems (evaluations), and 
output. 
  
3. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
3.1 Descriptive Statistics and Correlation 
The descriptive statistics for all the variables employed in the regression analysis are contained in Table 5. With regard to the 
market measure of performance, Tobin’s Q Panel A, a wide variation in its distribution is found ranging from a minimum of 0.07 to a 
maximum 6.61 and a mean of 1.59. Similar variations are found in the alternative governance variable, Voting% (Panel B). With the 
exception of AuditCode, the remaining control variables, Capital Expenditures, Long-Term Debt to Total Assets and firm size (value 
of total assets, TA) also exhibit wide variation in their distributions. The lack of variation in AuditCode implies the majority of firms 
(96%) comprising the sample use a BIG 4 auditor.   
-------------------------------------- 
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Insert Table 5 about here 
-------------------------------------- 
 
 
It would appear that no major multicollinearity exists between the variables, given the low correlations contained in Table 6.  
-------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 6 about here 
-------------------------------------- 
 
3.2 Firm Performance and Board Effectiveness  
Initially we test the strength of association between Board Effectiveness and firm performance measure, Tobin’s Q, using 
nonparametric chi-square goodness-of-fit tests.  We then test our hypotheses with regard to the relationship between firm performance 
and board effectiveness using the OLS regression model Equation 1: 
-------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 7 about here 
-------------------------------------- 
3.3 Discussion of Results 
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The results of the strength of association between board effectiveness and firm performance measure, Tobin’s Q, using nonparametric 
chi-square goodness-of-fit tests are reported in Table 7.  The test results are Pearson’s r and Spearman’s rho are 0.0.03591 and 
0.04541 respectively which suggests a weak positive relationship between Board Effectiveness and firm performance for sampled 
firms. We also report Goodman and Kruskal lambda and tau which also measure the strength of association based on the ability to 
correctly guess or predict the value of one variable, say, BSCI when one knows the value of the other variable ie Tobin’s Q. The 
Goodman and Kruskal Lambda of 0.00564 suggest that given the Board Effectiveness measure the misclassification proportion in 
predicting a particular firm’s Tobin’s Q is only reduced by about 0.56%.  The test also suggests that given a Tobin’s Q, the 
misclassification proportion in predicting the Board Effectiveness measure is 100%.  This suggests a weak association between the 
two variables. We also report a table for measures based on forming all possible pairs of observations with different response values to 
determine whether the pairs are concordant or discordant.  Panel C in Table 7 shows that the number of pairs of observations that are 
discordant is greater than concordant indicating a  weak association.  Sumers’s D, Goodman-Kruskal Gamma and Kendall’s tau are 
also reported in Panel C in Table 7.  Somers' D shows how many more concordant than discordant pairs exist divided by the total 
number of pairs and  Goodman-Kruskal Gamma also shows how many more concordant than discordant pairs exist divided by the 
total number of pairs excluding ties.   Kendall's Tau shows how many more concordant than discordant pairs exist divided by the total 
number of pairs of observations including pairs with the same response value.  Larger values for these measures indicate a better 
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predictive ability of the various responses and the predicted probabilities. All the values reported in the Table 7 are low and are about 
0.03 which indicate a poor fit of the model. 
-------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 8 about here 
-------------------------------------- 
 
The regression results of corporate governance on the contemporaneous market measure of firm performance Tobin’s Q are 
contained in Table 8. Firstly, we examine if contemporaneous firm value is influenced by board effectiveness. In model 1, the 
coefficient of Board Effectiveness is positive and statistically significant at the 0.01 level, thus implying that more effective boards are 
rewarded by the market. This result provides support for H1. Ceteris paribus, the 0.067 coefficient suggests that a 6.7% increase in 
firm value would result from a 10% improvement in board effectiveness. This result provides support for the findings of Adjaoud et al 
(2004). The control variables LTDTD and TA are statistically significant but negative. Jensen (1986)) suggests that high levels of 
leverage may create financial distress, thus this may explain LTDTA’s negative coefficient. CAPEX is negative and not statistically 
significant whilst the holding period return, HPR, is positive and statistically significant. AuditCode is as predicted: positive and 
significant. Audit code is positive and significant at the .05 level and thus this result supports the findings of DeAngelo (1981) and 
Barako et al. (2006) who determine that audit quality and auditor independence are positively associated with audit firm size, which 
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suggests that firms may have higher Tobin’s Q if they are audited by a BIG4 audit Secondly, we then explore the component parts of 
the overall measure of board effectiveness and the contemporaneous market measure of firm performance, Tobin’s Q, by substituting 
the component parts for Board Effectiveness in Equation 2. Thus, the following are substituted for Board Effectiveness in Equation 2; 
Independence (model II), Stock Ownership (model III), Structure (model IV), Systems (Evaluations) (model V), and Output (model 
VI). Independence and Structure have statistically significant positive coefficients at the 0.10 level. Thus, the market sees little value 
in Independence, a finding that supports the results of Hermalin and Welsbach (1991) whilst the latter finding provides weak support 
for the findings of Pi and Timme (1991). The remaining governance variables’ coefficients are positive, with the exception of Systems 
(Evaluations), but are not statistically significant.  
 
4. ROBUSTNESS ANALYSIS 
Following Larker and Rusticus (2010) and Ntim et al. (2011), we address potential endogeneity problems by estimating: a lagged 
corporate governance score-performance structure and employing two-stage least squares (2SLS). Thus, we re-estimate equation (1) as 
a lagged structure specified as:  
  ∑
=
−−− +++=
n
i
ititiitit CONTROLStivenessBoardEffecPerf
1
1110 εββα               (2)                            
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where everything remains the same as defined in equation (2), except that we employ a one year ahead performance measure and the 
lagged corporate governance measure, Board Effectiveness,  in which the next year’s performance measure depends on this year’s 
corporate governance grade. This method addresses the simultaneity problem noted by Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) which arises owing 
to the possible existence of an association between lagged corporate governance and firm performance. We also explore the 
relationship between the future market measure of performance and the lagged component parts of the governance grade; thus,  Board 
Effectiveness represents Independence, Stock Ownership, Structure, Systems (Evaluations), and Output. 
-------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 9 about here 
-------------------------------------- 
 
The regression results of board effectiveness on the one year ahead market measure of firm performance, represented by Tobin’s Q, 
are contained in Table 9. Firstly, we examine if future firm value is influenced by board effectiveness. In model I, the coefficient of 
Board Effectiveness is positive and statistically significant at the 0.01 level, thus implying that more effective boards are rewarded by 
the market. Ceteris paribus, the 0.070 coefficient suggests that a 7% increase in firm value would result from a 10% improvement in 
board effectiveness. The control variable LTDTA is negative and highly significant whilst HPR is positive and highly significant. The 
former result may be explained by the suggestion that high levels of leverage may create financial distress, which can restrict a firm’s 
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ability to exploit growth opportunities (Jensen (1986)). Audit code is positive and significant at the .10 level and thus this result 
supports the findings of DeAngelo (1981) and Barako et al. (2006).. Secondly, we explore the component parts of the overall measure 
of Board Effectiveness and the future market measure of firm performance, Tobin’s Q, by substituting the component parts for Board 
Effectiveness in Equation 2. Thus, the following are substituted for Grade in Equation 2; Independence (model II), Stock Ownership 
(model III), Structure (model IV), Systems (Evaluations) (model V), and Output (model VI). Output is the only component of Board 
Effectiveness that has a statistically significant positive coefficient at the 0.01 level. Ceteris paribus, the 0.088 coefficient suggests that 
a 8.8% increase in firm value would result from a 10% improvement in the board’s output. The remaining variables’ coefficients are 
positive (except Systems) but are only statistically significant. The results for Board  Effectiveness reported in Table 9 are generally 
similar to that reported in Table 8 which suggests that the relationship between performance and board effectiveness in our study is 
robust to a lagged performance structure. 
 
To address endogeneity problems that may be caused by omitted variable bias, we adopt a  2SLS technique (Agrawal and 
Knoeber, 1996; Black et al., 2006; Henry, 2008; Renders et al., 2010). Concentrated ownership may reduce agency costs and, thus, 
could increase firm value, since it is associated with greater managerial monitoring, Jensen (1986). Shleifer and Vishny (1986) suggest 
that large shareholders monitor managers and look for ways to better the firm. Thus, large shareholders are characterised as a 
corporate governance mechanism. The existence of an alternative corporate governance mechanism that is complementary to the 
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BSCI single grading can strengthen the link between Tobin’s Q and grading. Canadian firms may have a dual-class share structure, 
since there is no legal prohibition on such a structure; such firms tend to be smaller in size and are managed or closely-held by the 
founders, (Jog et al., 2010). Whilst the number of firms with a dual-class share structure that are listed on the TSX has dropped from 
14% in 1993 to 6% in 2010, (Amoako-Adu et al., 2011), the structure has been criticised for the risk of value entrenchment and the 
lack of shareholder rights. However, Jog et al., (2010), using a Canadian sample, find that firms with  a dual-class share structure do 
not have lower firm value, lower operating performance or inferior long-term stock performance compared to non dual-class share 
structure firms. Klein et al., (2005) use ownership percentage as a potential alternative governance mechanism. Given the dual-class 
share structure, we employ an alternative corporate governance measure, voting percentage (Voting%), to address the issue of the 
possible existence of an alternate corporate governance mechanism, which if omitted, could lead to spurious results of any analysis 
based on OLS.  Voting% is the percentage of votes attached to the voting shares held by the directors of the company and by other 
individuals or companies that own more than 10% of the equity shares of the company. Whilst Ownership% measures the percentage 
of shares held, Voting% is the real measure of the control of a firm, since it encompasses the voting power of dual and non-dual class 
shares. With regard to the latter, family/founders have a long-term interest in the firm, an argument that is consistent with family 
control reducing Type 1 agency problems (conflict between managers and shareholders (Jaggi et al., 2009).  
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In the first stage, we assume that the Board Effectiveness will be determined by the control variables; AUDITCODE, CAPEX, 
LTDTA, TA and HPR and the alternative corporate governance mechanism: Voting%.  Due to greater agency problems and greater 
public scrutiny, we expect larger firms to be more likely to voluntarily maintain better corporate governance practices, particularly in a 
principles-based environment (Beiner et al., 2006; Watts and Zimmerman, 1978). Thus, we expect the size related variables, TA and 
AuditCode, to be positively associated with the corporate governance score, Board Effectiveness. To be able to obtain cheaper external 
financing to exploit their greater investment and growth opportunities, we expect firms to voluntarily maintain better corporate 
governance practices (Beiner et al., 2006; Chen et al., 2010).Thus, we predict that CAPEX and LTDTA will correlate positively with 
the Board Effectiveness. We hypothesise a negative link between Voting% and Board Effectiveness, because higher Voting% can act 
as a substitute for good corporate governance, by reducing agency problems through closer managerial monitoring (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Cheung et al., 2007).  Thus, the first stage regression that we run is given by: 
            ∑
=
+++=
n
i
ititiitit CONTROLSVotingtivenessBoardEffec
1
10 % εββα              (3) 
 
The results of the first stage regression using equation 3 are contained in Table 10, Panel A. It would appear that Voting% is 
statistically associated with Board Effectiveness and Structure at the 0.00 level of significance and Independence, Stock Ownership at 
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the 0.01 level with coefficients of -0.015, -0.021, -0.005, and 0.005 respectively. This suggests that the predicted Board Effectiveness 
(entitled PBoardEffectivness) may be an appropriate instrument for Board Effectiveness. 
 
In the second stage, we use the predicted parts as instruments for the corporate governance mechanisms. Finally, we estimate 
equation (4) along with the control variables using the 2SLS technique given by:  
                             )4(ˆ
1
10 ∑
=
+++=
n
i
ititiitit CONTROLSctivenessPBoardEffePerf εββα           
where itctivenessPBoardEffe1βˆ  is the predicted value for board effectiveness from equation 3 and all other terms are as defined 
previously.  
 
           Equation 4 replicates equation 2 where everything remains the same except that Board Effectiveness is replaced with the 
predicted measure of Board Effectiveness from equation 4. This procedure considers firm performance as endogenous along with the 
alternative governance structure represented by Voting%, this allows the alternate mechanism to affect the other structure, in order to 
detect complementary or substitution effects. 
-------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 10 about here 
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The regression results from using the predicted values Grade (equation 5), its component parts and the control variables on the 
contemporaneous Tobin’s Q are reported in Table 10, Panel B. The coefficient of PBoardEffectiveness (model I) is positive and 
statistically significant, at the 0.00 level. This finding suggests that our results of a positive association between board effectiveness 
and performance is not sensitive to endogenity problems that may arise due to omitted variables and thus supports the findings of 
Ntim et al (2011).  For the control variables, LTDTA and TA (HPR) are negative (positive) and statistically significant across the 
overall predicted Grade and the component parts at the 0.001 level. The high F value and adjusted R2, 27.9%, might suggest that the 
predicted PBoard Effectiveness may be an appropriate instrument for Board Effectiveness. All the component parts of 
PBoardEffectiveness (models II-VI) are statistically significant at the 0.001 level. 
  
 
5. CONCLUSION 
This paper investigates, firstly whether superior board effectiveness represented by the annual Board Shareholder Confidence Index 
grade, published by CCBE is associated with superior firm performance.  Secondly, we investigate as to whether the component parts 
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of board effectiveness are associated with superior firm performance. An effective board of directors is central to agency theory’s 
prescription to protecting owners’ interests, the minimisation of agency costs and ensuring that principal-agent interests are aligned. 
The shareholders’ confidence in the board’s ability to fulfil its duties is an important measure of the success or not of this cornerstone 
of agency theory. Using a sample of 888 firm year observations from 2003 to 2009, we find a positive association between a firm’s 
board effectiveness and its performance, where performance is either a contemporaneous or a one year ahead Tobin’s Q. In assessing 
the component parts of the overall grade, we find that board structure and stock ownership are consistently positively associated with 
firm performance. Independence, structure and systems have no association with either the contemporaneous or the one year ahead 
market measure of performance. Our results are robust across a number of econometric models that control for different types of 
endogeneities and performance measures.  
 
Similar to prior studies, this paper is subject to limitations. Firstly, the findings are dependent of the underlying construct of the 
Board Shareholder Confidence Index.  An index cannot capture all aspects of good governance nor can it incorporate firm or industry 
specific influences. Secondly, it may be that the BSCI does not capture the elements of board effectiveness that the market considers 
important. Thirdly, a firm’s actual BSCI score is not available and thus our conversion mechanism is only an approximate measure of 
the score. The validity of our findings is subject to this constraint.  
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In Canada’s principles based regime, it would appear that certain aspects of board effectiveness, most notably independence, 
are not associated with firm performance. For the proponents of good governance this may seem paradoxical. The result may be 
explained by the fact that many of these companies are family run.  Thus, regulators may need to take cognisance of how firms are 
controlled in developing corporate governance policy. 
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TABLE 1  
CCBE’s Board Shareholder Confidence Index (BSCI) 
Conversion Mechanism  
BSCI Score BSCI Grade Board Effectiveness 
100 AAA+ 6 
95-99 AAA 5 
90-94 AA 4 
75-89 A 3 
50-74 B 2 
<50 C 1 
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2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Totals
Total published by CCBE 214 216 224 208 198 197 157 1414
Eliminated due to lack of 
Contemporaneous-HPR 34 32 31 26 22 24 20 189
Eliminated due to lack of share 
price data 13 10 9 8 1 2 1 44
SIC = 6xxx eliminated 23 25 26 28 30 30 28 190
Sales < $10m eliminated 46 52 49 42 37 23 11 260
Eliminated due to lack of Tobin's 
Q data 8 5 6 6 2 4 1 32
Sample Total 90(100%) 92(100%) 103(100%) 98(100%) 106(100%) 114(100%) 96(100%) 699(100%)
AAA+ 11(12%) 9(10%) 3(3%) 9(9%) 11(10%) 6(5%) 1(1%) 50(7%)
AAA 8(9%) 5(5%) 9(9%) 7(7%) 18(17%) 17(15%) 2(2%) 66(9%)
AA 20(22%) 4(4%) 6(6%) 9(9%) 3(3%) 11(10%) 5(5%) 58(8%)
A 16(18%) 28(30%) 33(32%) 27(28%) 25(24%) 28(25%) 19(20%) 176(25%)
B 28(31%) 35(38%) 36(35%) 35(36%) 34(32%) 33(29%) 38(40%) 239(34%)
C 7(8%) 11(12%) 16(16%) 11(11%) 15(14%) 19(17%) 31(32%) 110(16%)
TABLE 2
Summary of Original Dataset and Final Sample.
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Sector Description Frequency Sector Description Frequency
METAL MINING 136 FABRICATED METAL PRODUCTS MFRS 11
OIL & GAS EXTRACTION 126 APPAREL & OTHER FINISHED PRODUCTS-MFRS 7
ELECTRIC GAS & SANITARY SERVICES 43 TRANSPORTATION BY AIR 7
ELECTRONIC & OTHER ELECTRICAL EQUIP MFR 40 GENERAL MERCHANDISE STORES 7
CHEMICALS & ALLIED PRODUCTS MFRS 35 AUTOMOTIVE DEALERS & SERVICE STATIONS 7
COMMUNICATIONS 30 BUILDING MATERIALS & HARDWARE 6
LUMBER & WOOD PRODS EXCEPT FURNTR MFRS 26 MEASURING & ANALYZING INSTRUMENTS-MFRS 5
FOOD & KINDRED PRODUCTS MFRS 22 APPAREL & ACCESSORY STORES 5
WHOLESALE TRADE-DURABLE GOODS 21 PRIMARY METAL INDUSTRIES MFRS 4
FOOD STORES 21 MISCELLANEOUS MANUFACTURING INDS MFRS 4
PETROLEUM REFINING & RELATED INDS MFRS 20 AMUSEMENT & RECREATION SERVICES 4
BUSINESS SERVICES 18 HEAVY CONSTRUCTION EXCEPT BUILDING 3
MISCELLANEOUS RETAIL 15 EATING & DRINKING PLACES 3
PAPER & ALLIED PRODUCTS MFRS 14 PRINTING PUBLISHING & ALLIED INDUSTRIES 2
RAILROAD TRANSPORTATION 14 MOTOR FREIGHT TRANSPORTATION/WAREHOUSE 2
INDUSTRIAL & COMMERCIAL MACHINERY MFRS 13 WHOLESALE TRADE-NONDURABLE GOODS 2
TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT MFRS 13 HOME FURNITURE & FURNISHINGS STORES 1
ENGINEERING & ACCOUNTING & MGMT SVCS 12 TOTAL for All Sectors 699
TABLE 3
This table reports the frequency of the 699 firm year observations ranked by highest frequency across the Sector Description 
based on the two-digit SIC Code. The sectors in Column 1 represent  89% of the sample.
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Notes: All variables comprising the Board Shareholder Confidence Index are taken from the University of Toronto’s Clarkson Centre for Business Ethics. The 
alternative corporate governance measure is taken from Stockguide. Data for the market measure of performance and the control variables is taken from 
Compustat.
TABLE 4 
Summary of Variables 
Board Shareholder Confidence Index 
Board Effectiveness A rating system which assigns companies constituting the S&P/TSX 
Composite Index an overall grade from AAA+ [highest] to C [lowest]. 
Independence Director Independence measures the independence of individual 
Directors from one another, as well as from company management as 
well as Interlocks and Excessive board membership. The core from 
AAA [highest] to C [lowest].  
Stock Ownership This is based on the average holdings of the third of Directors with the 
fewest holdings, relative to the Directors’ annual retainer value. 
Structure Structural measurements include: i) The separation of CEO and Chair 
positions, ii) Independence of Audit, Compensation and Nominating 
Committee members, iii) The ratio of voting rights to share ownership 
between share classes. 
Systems (Evaluations) A company must implement regular and formal evaluation processes 
for the Board as a whole and for each of its individual Directors. 
Scoring is based on disclosure of the evaluation processes; 
Output Output is measured as; Dilution of shareholder value, Option Re-
pricing, CEO Pay Related to Performance, Evergreen Option Plan 
Outstanding and Loans to Directors or Executives. 
Alternative Corporate Governance Measure 
Voting% The percentage of votes attached to the voting shares held by the 
directors of the company and by other individuals or companies that 
own more than 10% of the equity shares of the company. 
Market Performance Measure 
Tobin’s Q [Market Value of Equity +Preference Stock + Long Term Debt + 
Current Assets – Current Liabilities]/Total Assets 
Control Variables 
AUDITCODE BIG4 audit firm=1, 0 otherwise 
CAPEX Annual Firm Capital Expenditure 
LTDTA Long-Term Debt to Total Assets 
TA Firm’s total assets in year t. 
HPR Annual holding period share price return 
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 Column N* represents missing values. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
TABLE  5 
Descriptive Statistics of All Variables 
Variable N N* Mean SE StDev Minimum Q1 Median Q3 Maximum 
Panel A: Market Performance Measure 
Tobin’s Q 699 0 1.59 0.04 0.97 0.07 0.94 1.28 1.96 6.61 
 
Panel B: Corporate Governance Variable 
Board Effectiveness 699 0 2.83 0.05 1.43 1.00 2.00 3.00 3.00 6.00 
           
Panel C: Corporate Governance Variable 
Voting% 653 46 21.11 0.96 24.58 0.00 0.66 12.20 32.09 94.10 
           
Panel D: Control Variables 
AuditCode 699 0 0.97 0.01 0.17 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
CAPEX 699 0 593.10 45.80 1210.20 0.10 64.50 164.00 508.60 10102.90 
LTDTA 699 0 0.18 0.01 0.14 0.000 0.06 0.17 0.28 0.63 
TA 699 0 5923 335 8865 71 859 2207 6239 57830 
HPR 699 0 13.66 2.05 54.08 -97.85 -16.44 9.23 33.42 510.67 
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TABLE  6 
Correlation Matrix of the Variables for all (888) Firm Years 
 
 
 
Board 
Effectiveness Tobin’s Q 
 
Voting% AuditCode CAPEX LTDTA TA 
 
HPR 
Board 
Effectiveness    0.02 
 
-0.36***  0.00   0.18***   0.09*** 
  
0.20*** 
 
-0.04 
Tobin’s Q   0.02  
 
-0.20***  0.10*** -0.11*** -0.32*** -0.19*** 
 
0.35*** 
Voting% -034*** -0.20***  -0.07* -0.11*** 0.13*** -0.06* -0.05 
AuditCode  0.00   0.10*** -0.08**  0.05 -0.07**  0.08* 0.03 
CAPEX 0.17*** -0.11*** 
 
-0.11***   0.05   0.17***  0.83*** 
 
0.01 
LTDTA 0.09*** -0.32*** 
 
0.13*** -0.07*  0.17***   0.25*** 
 
-0.06* 
TA 0.20*** -0.19*** -0.06*  0.8**  0.83***  0.25***  -0.02 
HPR -0.03* 0.35*** -0.05 0.03 0.01 -0.06* -0.02  
 
Notes: The bottom left of the table presents the Pearson’s parametric correlation coefficients, whilst the upper right reports 
Spearman’s non-parametric correlation coefficients. ***, ** and * denote correlation is significant at the .01, .05 and .10 level, 
respectively (two-tailed test). Variables are defined as: Board Effectiveness, Tobin’s Q, Ownership% , more than 10% of the Equity 
interest held by a group,  AuditCode, BIG4 audit firm=1 zero otherwise,  CAPEX Annual Capital Expenditures,  LTDTA, long-term 
debt to total assets, TA is the firm’s total assets in year t. Table 4 provides the full definitions of all the variables used. 
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TABLE 7  
Strength of Association between Tobin’s Q and Board Effectiveness 
Panel A    
Pearson's r               0.03591   
Spearman's rho        0.04541   
    
Panel B    
Goodman – Kruskal    
Dependent variable  Lambda      Tau  
Tobin’s Q       0.00564   0.00564  
Total Score 1.00000 1.00000  
    
Panel C-][    
Measures of Concordance for 
Ordinal Categories 
   
Pairs   Number   Summary Measures  
Concordant    155355 Somers' D (Tobin’s Q 
dependent)        
 
0.0300 
Discordant    143941 Somers' D (Total Score 
dependent)     
 
0.0381 
Ties            94532   Goodman and Kruskal's 
Gamma           
0.0381 
Total          393828   Kendall's Tau-b 0.0332 
Test of Concordance:  P-Value =  0.0896808  
  
47 
 
TABLE 8 
OLS Regression of the Corporate Governance Effects on the Contemporaneous Tobin’s Qt 
Dependent 
Variable 
Model I 
Tobin’s Qt 
Model II 
Tobin’s Qt 
Model III 
Tobin’s Qt 
Model IV 
Tobin’s Qt 
Model V 
Tobin’s Qt 
Model VI 
Tobin’s Qt 
Independent 
Variables 
Coeff P-Value Coeff P-Value Coeff P-Value Coeff P-Value Coeff P-Value Coeff P-Value 
Governance 
Variables 
            
Board 
Effectivenesst 
 
0.067 0.005**           
Independencet 
 
  0.044 0.09†         
Stock 
Ownershipt 
 
    0.026 0.257       
Structuret 
 
      0.042 0.072†     
Systems 
(Evaluations)t 
        -0.011 0.694   
Outputt           0.035 0.255 
Control 
Variables 
            
AuditCodet 0.445 0.016** 0.416 0.025* 0.423 0.023* 0.425 0.022* 0.411 0.027* 0.423 0.023* 
CAPEXt -0.000 0.997 0.000 0.964 0.000*** 0.885 0.000 0.0997 0.000 0.885 -0.000 0.729 
LTDTAt -2.097 0.000*** -2.061 0.001*** -2.089 0.000*** -2.101 0.000*** -2.091 0.000*** -2.072 0.000*** 
TAt -0.000 0.018** -0.000 0.04* -0.000 0.023* -0.000 0.032* -0.000 0.034* -0.000 0.03* 
HPRt 0.005 0.000*** 0.005 0.000*** 0.005 0.000*** 0.005 0.000*** 0.005 0.000*** 0.008 0.000*** 
Constant 0.939 0.005*** 2.766 0.001*** 1.102 0.001** 0.990 0.004*** 1.231 0.000*** 3.100 0.001*** 
Industry Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Years Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
             
F-Value 18.36 0.000 17.96 0.000 17.83 0.000 17.99 0.000 17.74 0.000 20.73 0.000 
Adjusted R2 0.309  0.304  .303  0.305  0.302  0.371  
Number of  
Observations 
699  699  699  699  699  603  
Durbin Watson 
 
0.914 
  
0.892 
  
0.908 
  
0.902 
  
0.896 
  
0.858 
 
Notes: This table presents the estimated coefficients from six different models examining the effects of Board Effectiveness on firm performance, where performance is measured 
by a contemporaneous Tobin’s Q. Model I examines whether a firm’s overall measure of governance (Grade) contributes to firm performance; The remaining Models II-VI 
investigates whether the component parts of Board Effectiveness contributes to firm performance. Table 4 provides the full definitions of all the variables used. Coefficients are in 
column 1 of each model. ***, **, * and † denote significance at the 001, .01, .05 and .10 level, respectively (two-tailed tests) in column 2 of each model.  
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TABLE 9 
OLS Regression of the Corporate Governance Effects on the 1 Year Ahead Tobin’s Q: Controlling for Endogeneity 
Dependent Variable 
Model I 
Tobin’s 
Qt 
 
Model 
II 
Tobin’s 
Qt 
 
Model 
III 
Tobin’s 
Qt 
 
Model 
IV 
Tobin’s 
Qt 
 Model 
V 
Tobin’s 
Qt 
 Model 
VI 
Tobin’s 
Qt 
 
Independent Variables Coeff P-Value Coeff P-Value Coeff P-Value Coeff P-Value Coeff P-Value Coeff P-Value 
Governance 
Variables 
            
Board Effectivenessst-1 
 
0.070 0.005**           
Independencet-1 
 
  0.027 0.345         
Stock 
Ownershipt-1 
 
    0.029 0.252       
Structuret-1 
 
      0.009 0.710     
Systems 
(Evaluations)t-1 
        0.020 0.448   
Outputt-1           0.088 0.006** 
Control 
Variables 
            
AuditCodet-1 0.374 0.062† 0.334 0.098† 0.350 0.083† 0.339 0.093† 0.336 0.096* 0.344 0.087† 
CAPEXt-1 -0.000 0.337 -0.000 0.400 -0.000 0.423 -0.000 0.416 -0.0001 0.433 -0.000 0.406 
LTDTAt-1 -2.172 0.000*** -2.141 0.000*** -2.172 0.000*** -2.164 0.000*** -2.163 0.000*** -2.205 0.000*** 
TAt-1 -0.000 0.280 -0.000 0.369 -0.000 0.301 -0.000 0.327 -0.000 0.284 -0.000 0.228 
HPRt-1 0.004 0.000*** 0.005 0.000*** 0.005 0.000*** 0.005 0.000*** 0.005 0.000*** 0.005 0.000*** 
Constant 1.275 0.000*** 1.498 0.000*** 1.485 0.000*** 1.591 0.000*** 1.557 0.000*** 1.225 0.001*** 
Industry Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Years Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
             
F-Value 13.02 0.000 12.47 0.000 12.50 0.000 12.41 0.000 12.44 0.000 12.99 0.000 
Adjusted R2 0.287  0.277  0.278  0.276  0.272  0.286  
Durbin-Watson 1.094  1.089  1.097  1.091  1.088  1.093  
Number of  
Observations 
 
 
539 
  
539 
  
539 
  
539 
  
539 
  
539 
 
Notes: This table presents the estimated coefficients from six different models examining the effects of Board Effectiveness on firm performance, where performance is measured 
by a one year ahead Tobin’s Q. Model I examines whether a firm’s Board Effectiveness contributes to firm performance; The remaining Models II-VI investigates whether the 
component parts of the governance score contributes to firm performance. Table 4 provides the full definitions of all the variables used. Coefficients are column 1 of each model.. 
***, ** and * denote significance at the .001, .01 and .05 level, respectively (two-tailed tests) in column 2 of each model. 
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TABLE 10 
OLS Regression of the Substitutes for Corporate Governance Grade, Ownership% and Voting% to Control for Endogeneity 
1st Stage 
Panel A 
Dependent 
Variable 
Board Effectiveness 
Independence 
 
 
Stock 
Ownership 
 
 
Structure Systems 
(Evaluations) 
 
Output 
Independent 
Variables 
Coeff P-Value Coeff P-Value Coeff P-Value Coeff P-Value Coeff P-Value Coeff P-Value 
Governance 
Variables 
            
             
Voting% -0.015 0.000*** -0.005 0.007** -0.005 0.014** -0.021 0.000*** -0.001 0.775 -0.000 0.796 
             
Control 
Variables 
            
AuditCode -0.264 0.397 0.131 0.646 -0.659 0.044* 0.019 0.950 0.097 0.755 0.029 0.910 
CAPEX -0.000 0.520 0.000 0.444 0.000 0.421 -0.000 0.627 -0.000 0.247 -0.000 0.001*** 
LTDTA 1.519 0.000*** 0.221 0.544 0.271 0.515 1.301 0.001*** 0.538 0.174 1.122 0.120 
TA 0.000 0.004*** -0.000 0.050** 0.000 0.448 0.000 0.153 0.000 0.000*** 0.000 0.028 
HPR -0.000 0.423 0.000 0.921 -0.00 0.081† -0.000 0.658 -0.003 0.001*** 0.003 0.004** 
Constant 2.99 0.001*** 3.922 0.001*** 4.521 0.000*** 3.680 0.000*** 3.234 0.020** 3.249 0.000*** 
             
F-Value 17.17 0.000 42.17 0.0044 4.11 0.000 20.41 0.000 9.14 0.000 6.55 0.000 
Adjusted R2 .13  0.011  .028  .152  .070  .056  
Durbin 
Watson 
1.078  1.141  1.269  .966  1.154  1.179  
Number of  
Observations 
 
653  653  653  653  653  560  
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TABLE 10 
(Continued) 
OLS Regression of the Corporate Governance Effects on the Contemporaneous Tobin’s Qt Controlling for Endogeneity 
2nd  Stage 
Panel B 
Dependent 
Variable 
Model I 
Tobin’s Qt 
Model II 
Tobin’s Qt 
Model III 
Tobin’s Qt 
Model IV 
Tobin’s Qt 
Model V 
Tobin’s Qt 
Model VI 
Tobin’s Qt 
Independent 
Variables 
Coeff P-Value Coeff P-Value Coeff P-Value Coeff P-Value Coeff P-Value Coeff P-Value 
Governance 
Variables 
            
PBoard 
Effectiveness 
 
0.365 0.000***           
PIndependence 
 
  1.025 0.000***         
PStock 
Ownership 
 
    0.987 0.000***       
PStructure 
 
      0.268 0.000***     
PSystems 
(Evaluations) 
        8.888 0.000***   
POutput           11.035 0.000*** 
Control 
Variables 
            
AuditCode 0.518 0.008** 0.287 0.136 1.073 0.000*** 0.417 0.03* -0.4398 0.011 0.093 0.064 
CAPEX 0.000 0.119 0.000 0.993 -0.000 0.873 0.000 0.168 0.000 0.000*** 0.000 0.000*** 
LTDTA -2.699 0.000*** -2.371 0.000*** -2.412 0.000*** -2.494 0.000*** -6.925 0.000*** -14.521 0.000*** 
TA -0.000 0.000*** -0.000 0.657 -0.000 0.000*** -0.000 0.000*** -0.000 0.000*** -0.000 0.000*** 
HPR 0.006 0.000*** 0.005 0.000*** 0.007 0.000*** 0.005 0.000*** 0.034 0.000*** -0.027 0.000*** 
Constant 0.064 0.044* -2.287 0.02* -2.730 0.012* 0.745 0.013* -27.011 0.000*** 1.715 0.001*** 
             
F-Value 42.96 0.00) 42.96 0.000 42.96 0.000 42.96 0.000 42.96 0.000 42.96 0.000 
Adjusted R2 .279  .279  .279  .279  .279  .279  
Durbin 
Watson 
0.975  0.975  0.975  0.975  0.975  0.975  
Number of 
Obsrvations 
653  653  653  653  653  653  
Notes: This table presents the estimated coefficients from six different models examining the effects of Board Effectiveness)on firm performance, where performance is measured 
by a contemporaneous Tobin’s Q, Panel C. Model I examines whether a firm’s Board Effectiveness contributes to firm performance; The remaining Models II-VI investigates 
whether the component parts of Board Effectiveness to firm performance. Table 4 provides the full definitions of all the variables used. Coefficients are in column 1 of each model, 
***, ** and* denote significance at the 001, .01 and .05 level,, respectively (two-tailed tests) in column 2 of each model. 
 
